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Proponents of board reforms assume that corporate structures and director-specific provisions matter. This
paper argues that reformers have set minimum standards, but failed to take into account various trade-offs and
regulatory capture effects. It is thus suggested that the flexibility of existing provisions be increased and that
this new approach be used to improve shareholder protection against board failures in general and failures of
institutional investor boards in particular.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the various factors contributing to a firm’s
success, board powers, structure, composition, and
procedures are likely to weigh less than, say, the
adequacy of the firm’s business model or the quali-
ties of its top executives (see also Bertrand and
Schoar, 2003). It thus comes as no great surprise
that shareholders, consultants, politicians, and aca-
demics alike had long paid only rather limited atten-
tion to such mundane corporate governance is-
sues—much to the delight of executives in both
widely held and controlled firms.
Interest in boards has, however, been significantly
augmented in past decades (Millstein and
MacAvoy, 2003). Increase in US takeover activity
during the 1980s and emerging globalization were
instrumental in bringing corporate governance back
from obscurity. The takeover bubble reminded
market participants about significant conflicts of
interests between managers and shareholders, while
increasing competition made it difficult to neglect
any factor that could contribute to firm perform-
ance. Boards eventually moved to corporate centre
stage, owing to exponential growth in managerial
compensation throughout the 1990s, followed by
1 I thank Lucian Bebchuk, Francesco Chiappetta, Luca Enriques, Colin Mayer, Elu von Thadden, and the participants in the ECGI/
Oxford Review of Economic Policy conference on Corporate Governance (Saïd Business School, Oxford, 28–29 January 2005) for
their helpful comments.
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economic downturn and corporate scandals at the
turn of the century.
Directors were, indeed, ideal culprits. They were
the ones who had approved often extraordinarily
large compensation packages without much of an
inquiry about their justification or true costs. They
also failed to detect the financial manipulation and
asset diversions that caused, or at least contributed
to the downfall of major firms. Once hindsight made
it clear that many executives were given the wrong
incentives and that boards were not adequately
monitoring them, directors were an easy target for
political entrepreneurs—and welcome scapegoats
for other possible culprits, such as greedy invest-
ment bankers or exuberant investors.
Board reform proposals, which had already started
to flourish in the late 1990s, multiplied following the
Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat cohort of scan-
dals. Law-makers in the EU, the USA, and else-
where took the view that weak boards were a
distinct feature of companies engaging in fraud and
had to be reformed so as to play effectively their
first-line-of-defence role against corporate mal-
practice (European Commission, 2004). Agencies
and courts did not want to be left behind, especially
in the USA (see Veasey, 2004). Thus, both the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Delaware judiciary are currently pondering
whether to take steps to give shareholders more of
a say in board elections or to reinforce directors’
fiduciary duties. At the same time, almost countless
self-regulatory ‘codes’ and governance ‘indices’
were being enacted by bodies of all kinds—some
acting on behalf of governments or established
interest groups, other simply implementing advertis-
ing efforts by consultants eager to sell their corpo-
rate governance services.
It follows that board reform proposals reflect quite
diverging agendas, which casts doubts on their
effectiveness or efficiency. In particular, it cannot
be denied that law-makers sometimes pass mere
‘me-too’ reforms, whereas self-regulatory codes
enacted by interest groups often resemble damage
limitation exercises. Moreover, even ‘honest’ pro-
posals may prove inefficient because of failures to
take into consideration the board’s multiple func-
tions: crisis management, regulatory compliance,
management monitoring, strategy setting, and me-
diation of conflicts of interests. Finally, proposals
that seem justified or rather harmless today could
end up having costly ‘petrification’ effects (Buxbaum
and Hopt, 1988). Indeed, reformers generally battle
past scandals rather than future market failures,
their main purpose being the short-term rebuilding of
investor confidence or the soothing of voter anger
prior to the next election.
On the other hand, regulatory intervention may be a
prerequisite for boards to adopt quality-enhancing
governance changes. This is likely to be the case not
only when it comes to reducing directors’ private
benefits (Bebchuk, 2003), but also for mere depar-
tures from the existing equilibrium. For example,
directors often fear that the undertaking of govern-
ance changes in the absence of regulatory support
will send the wrong signal to investors, i.e. be
interpreted as due to yet to be disclosed problems.
To be sure, market forces often prove sufficient to
generate needed changes. For example, many listed
firms started to address board deficiencies well
before reforms were adopted (see, for example,
Sonnenfeld, 2002). But overall board change can be
slow, even under combined market and regulatory
pressure. Hence, scandals and recent reforms are
said still to have limited impact on US managers’
established practice of ignoring shareholder wishes
on key governance questions.2
It thus cannot simply be stated that regulatory
intervention has no positive net present value. Sec-
tion II, therefore, provides an overview of board
reforms, while section III assesses their scope.
Efficiency and regulatory capture issues are dis-
cussed in section IV. Section V concludes with
some policy recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF BOARD REFORMS
On-going board reforms can be divided into three
broad categories. The first comprises proposals
aiming at reducing board discretion by reinforcing
the powers of shareholders and auditors. A second
category of reforms aims at improving board
2 See, for example, Millstein (2004).
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independence by dealing with board structure,
composition, and procedure. Finally, director incen-
tives are targeted through director compensation
and liability provisions.
(i) Constraining Board Discretion
Proposals aiming at reinforcing shareholder powers
diverge somewhat on opposite sides of the Atlantic,
reflecting differences in the ownership structures of
listed US and European firms. The former are
generally widely held, while the latter are often
dominated by large shareholders (La Porta et al.,
1999; Barca and Becht, 2001; Cheffins, 2001). As a
result, board elections are typically in the hands of the
firms’ executives in the USA, whereas in Europe
controlling block holders have a history of reinforc-
ing their grip over the board by minimizing the
corporate affairs involvement of small sharehold-
ers.
Thus, the main US regulatory debate is about giving
shareholders more of a say in director elections.
Shareholders that are dissatisfied with board nomi-
nees currently have two equally unattractive op-
tions. One is to mount a costly and uncertain cam-
paign for rival proxies. The other is to withhold their
vote, a tactic that signals opposition but is not binding
for the board.
Against this background, the SEC has proposed a
new rule, permitting shareholders holding more than
5 per cent of voting rights to nominate candidates for
election as directors, provided that at least one of the
nominees proposed by the board in the previous
election received more than 35 per cent ‘withhold’
votes.3 However, this or any related proposals have
yet to be adopted, owing to strong opposition led by
the Business Roundtable, an association comprising
more than 150 chief executive officers (CEOs)
from the largest US corporations. Despite, or pos-
sibly because of this stalemate, the Delaware judi-
ciary has taken it upon itself to find a solution.
Adopting a rather unusual approach, Delaware
judges are discussing ways to increase sharehold-
ers’ powers to vote out unwanted directors with
representatives of institutional investors.4
In Europe, by contrast, the focus is on giving the
general meeting the right to vote on remuneration
policies and stock option plans—a subject that is
more a matter of academic than law-maker interest
in the USA.5 The UK Combined Code has recently
been amended to allow investors in listed companies
an advisory vote on executive pay plans, a practice
that is said to have proven quite effective in forcing
companies to take into account institutional investor
opinion. The European Commission is similarly rec-
ommending that member states let shareholders of
listed companies vote on director remuneration
policies as well as on schemes under which direc-
tors are remunerated in shares or share options, or
on the basis of share movement.6 There is more
divergence when it comes to individual executive
pay. For example, strong union and political pres-
sure was needed to bring German listed companies
to merely disclose individual executive compensa-
tion figures—a standard practice in the UK.
Board powers are also constrained by reforms
aiming at increasing the compliance role of auditors,
not least because recent scandals have revealed
various instances of audit complacency. The USA
has taken the lead by requiring auditors to attest the
adequacy of internal controls over financial data
(Section 404, Sarbanes–Oxley Act—SOX). This
requirement reduces board discretion by forcing
directors to comply with auditor instructions unless
they are prepared to inform investors that they have
not dealt with material weaknesses identified by
auditors. In Europe, the European Commission is
proposing the adoption of a Directive to reinforce
auditor independence, in particular by limiting the
board’s ability to participate in audit execution and
restricting auditor dismissal to ‘proper grounds’
cases only.7
3 See Securities Exchange Act Release 48,626, 81 SEC Docket 770 (2003).
4 See Tucker (2004).
5 The SEC, for example, is more interested in getting firms to disclose executive compensation packages in a user-friendly form
than in getting shareholders to vote on them.
6 See Commission Recommendation on Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies
[2004] O.J. L 385/55.
7 See Proposal for a Directive on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts COM(2004) 177 final (March
2004), available at europa.eu.int
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(ii) Reinforcing Board Independence
On-going reforms also aim at pressuring firms listed
in major jurisdictions to improve board independ-
ence, be it from the firm’s executives, controlling
shareholders, or other parties whose influence may
prove costly. Boards should have a majority of
independent directors and set up nominating, com-
pensation, and audit committees comprising only, or
at least a majority of independent directors. More-
over, the separation of CEO and board chairperson
is either encouraged by providing new default provis-
ions (as is the case in France) or by recommending
that CEOs should not act as chairpersons. Alterna-
tively, independent directors are expected to con-
vene without the CEO or other executives being
present, the meeting being chaired by a lead director.
It has not escaped reformers’ attention that focus-
ing on directorial independence means little without
proper definition. First movers have adopted rather
general definitions. For example, the revised New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company
Manual defines independent directors as those
having ‘no material relationship’ with the listed
company, whereas the UK’s Combined Code re-
fers to the non-existence of ‘relationship or circum-
stances that are likely to affect or appear to affect
the director’s judgment’.8 However, it was felt that
the flexibility of these definitions could threaten their
effectiveness. Reformers thus supplemented them
by specific examples of non-independence, such as
the existence of a relationship with a major supplier
or customer (NYSE Listed Company Manual) or
the representation of a significant shareholder (UK
Combined Code).
These specific examples have been a source of
concern, especially in firms with concentrated
shareholdings or co-determined boards. As a result,
the European Commission had to water down its
Recommendation on non-executive directors.9 While
independence is still defined as being free from any
business, family, or other relationship that creates a
conflict of interest such as to jeopardize independent
judgement, examples of non-independence have
been relegated to an ‘additional guidance’ annex. At
the same time, however, Delaware courts seem to
be signalling that directors will have to fulfil increasing-
ly demanding criteria to be considered independent
in votes involving controlling shareholder interests.10
Reformers are also aware that independence is not
only a question of structure and composition, but
also of procedures. Thus, both the NYSE Listed
Company Manual and the European Commis-
sion’s Recommendation on non-executive directors
emphasize the need for the board to carry out
regular evaluations of its own performance.
(iii) Director Incentives
Reformers are not only addressing board independ-
ence, but also board competence. In particular, audit
committee members of firms listed on the NYSE
are required to be financially literate, while at least
one of them shall have accounting or related finan-
cial management expertise. More generally, the
European Commission is recommending that boards
be composed of members who, as a whole, have the
required diversity of knowledge, judgement, and
expertise to complete their task properly.11
Reformers expected the more stringent director
independence and competence requirements to have
implications for compensation, as they were likely to
increase reputation and liability risks. Hence, the
European Commission has recommended that listed
firms disclose director compensation data, which
should include information about the variable and
non-variable remuneration, as well as information
about non-cash and retirement benefits.
Time will tell whether board reforms will signifi-
cantly change director liability risks. Current Dela-
ware Court of Chancery opinions seem less board
friendly than they used to be, as exemplified by the
Court of Chancery’s ruling that directors with
8 §303A(2) NYSE Listed Company Manual and §A.3.1 UK Combined Code.
9 See Commission Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board [2005] O.J. L 52/51.
10 See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Delaware Chancery Court 2003) (board inquiry into possible
insider trading); Emerging Communications Shareholders Litigation, 2004 Delaware Chancery Court, LEXIS 70 (approval of going
private transaction).
11 See Commission Recommendation, fn. 9.
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specialized knowledge or expertise are held to
higher standards than other directors.12 Similarly,
Germany’s Bundesgerichtshof has recently set a
precedent by holding that supervisory board mem-
bers could individually be sued over false announce-
ments.13 However, it would be premature to ex-
trapolate from recent judicial activism or scandal-
related record US settlements that a new trend has
been set.14
III. SCOPE OF REFORM:
REGULATORY TIMIDITY OR
HYPOCRISY?
On-going board reforms generally target listed firms.
There are, however, significant gaps and spill-
overs. On the one hand, institutional investors, such
as mutual and pension funds, are generally left
outside the scope of corporate governance codes.15
On the other hand, board reforms have a de facto
impact on non-listed firms, regardless of their size
and ownership structure.
The question thus arises as to whether board re-
forms are under-inclusive or over-inclusive. We
address the first question in the section devoted to
regulatory capture issues. The second question can
be dealt with in two steps: (i) is there a one-size-fits-
all issue? (ii) if so, are reforms imposed upon firms
that cannot afford them?
(i) One Size Fits All?
Although the reforms described in section II were
originally designed for large, widely held Anglo-
Saxon firms, they are having or can be expected to
have an impact on firms around the world, regard-
less of their size and ownership structure.16
Continental European reluctance to follow the UK
and US lead started to soften owing to EU firms
increasingly tapping US capital markets, and prac-
tically disappeared once it became clear that corpo-
rate scandals were not confined to North America.17
For their part, firms listed in industrialized Asian
countries or in developing and transition countries
are increasingly forced to show compliance with
some kind of corporate governance principles if
they want to avoid the costs associated with scoring
badly on global corporate governance tables.18
Similar dilemmas are faced by non-listed publicly
held firms, as well as by privately held firms. For
example, lenders increasingly take into account
governance issues when determining a firm’s credit
rating (see Grunert et al., 2005). A comparable
approach seems to be adopted by venture capitalists
selecting possible investment opportunities and in-
surance companies having to price directors and
officers (D&O) liability premiums.
It follows that board reforms have de facto one-
size-fits-all consequences, which raises efficiency
issues. In spite of globalization, there are still signifi-
cant financial system, ownership structure, and
legal or cultural differences between jurisdictions
(Allen and Gale, 2000). Experiences in developing
or transition jurisdictions are a case in point about the
potential inefficiency of legal transplants (Black et
al., 2000; Pistor et al., 2002). Moreover, even
assuming that the alleged costs of SOX-like reforms
are exaggerated or balanced by investor-confi-
dence benefits (Li et al., 2004), it seems at least
plausible that submitting smaller firms to govern-
ance principles designed for larger firms will prove
inefficient.
To be sure, corporate governance regulation and
codes often take into account that some rules can be
disproportionate or less relevant for smaller firms.
For example, the UK’s Combined Code explicitly
exempts listed companies that are not among the
350 largest from some of its provisions (Preamble,
12 Emerging Communications Shareholders Litigation, 2004 Delaware Court of Chancery LEXIS 70.
13 In re Infomatec AG, BGH II ZR 217/03, 218/03 and 402/02 of 19 July 2004 (English summary available at germanlawjournal.com).
14 See also Black et al. (2005).
15 For example, the UK Combined Code devotes a section to institutional investor behaviour, but does not deal with their boards’
structure, composition, or procedure.
16 See Cheffins (2000), Hopt and Leyens (2004), and Stork (2004).
17 See also Birchall and Tait (2004), citing PwC Research data: compared to 2003, class actions against non-US firms almost
doubled in 2004.
18 Tables such as those by Governance Metrics International are given prominent investor attention: see Roberts (2004a),
emphasizing the low scores obtained by Japanese and Hong-Kong listed companies.
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No. 6). Somewhat similarly, the NYSE Listed
Company Manual permits family-controlled com-
panies not to comply with some of its rules, provided
they disclose that choice (Section 303A). In addition,
owing to the generalization of the ‘comply or explain’
regulatory approach, listed firms may ignore most rules
in most jurisdictions, provided they disclose the particu-
lar circumstances justifying their doing so.
However, it would be naïve to believe that firms can
easily avoid compliance. Corporate governance
provisions, whether enacted by law-makers or part
of self-regulatory codes, have standardization effects.
First, the default nature of governance codes does not
mean that they are not sticky. Investor expectations
can make non-compliance by listed firms costly,
even when compliance would have no specific
advantages (see Sunstein, 2002; Korobkin, 2003).
Second, financial analysts can be expected to frown
on publicly held firms that force them to engage in
specific governance assessments. More generally,
lending officers are likely to find it more risky to deal
with firms of any size that do not follow what is
considered ‘good practice’, especially given the
importance assigned to borrower corporate govern-
ance under the revised capital-adequacy frame-
work (Basel II).
In short, there is a one-size-fits-all issue. It is thus
justified to ascertain whether some firms are likely to
be subject to disproportionate costs by examining the
magnitude of the changes induced by board reforms.
(ii) Minimum Standards, Not ‘Best Practices’
Corporate governance reformers often claim that
they are providing ‘best practice’ or ‘good govern-
ance’ provisions. However, it is more accurate to
refer to reformers’ output as representative of
‘average practice’ or ‘minimum standards’.
Admittedly, on-going board reforms are likely to
have some impact even for the ‘best’ listed firms.
For example, board reforms have certainly contrib-
uted to boards in Europe and the USA increasingly
meeting without the CEO being present.19 Similarly,
recent claims about difficulties in recruiting non-
executive directors and increases in their remunera-
tion are likely to be at least partly related to board
reforms.20
Generally speaking, however, reforms tend to fol-
low rather than cause change in the boardroom.
Hence, recent board reforms do not seem to have
had a significant impact. For example, according to
a recent multi-jurisdiction survey, directors of EU
firms doubt that new corporate governance codes
are making a noticeable difference.21 Or, to take
another example, while board reforms may have
contributed to increased refusal rates and compen-
sation levels, they do not seem to have significantly
affected the supply of candidate directors or their
remuneration.22
Conversely, many observable board changes are
due to market forces rather than regulatory re-
forms. There is evidence that economic shocks are
the main cause of US board structure adjustments,
not regulatory reforms (Denis and Sarin, 1999).
Similarly, the fact that European boards have re-
cently proved more likely than their US counterparts
to fire the CEO must be related to either competitive
pressures or controlling shareholder activism.23 Or,
to take another example, the number of outsiders on
Japanese boards is expected to increase following
the profitability-driven dismantling of cross-
shareholdings.24 Reformers, themselves, seem to
19 See Raghavan (2005), citing a Spencer Stuart study according to which S&P 500 CEOs nowadays serve on 0.9 outside boards
on average, compared to two in 1997; Ascarelli (2004a), citing a Korn/Ferry survey.
20 Smith (2004), citing a Korn/Ferry survey according to which 2004 refusal rates are 31 per cent for Germany (11 per cent in
2003); 51 per cent in UK (46 per cent in 2003); and 52 per cent in France (38 per cent in 2003); Roberts (2004b), citing Compliance
Week data for the USA; Overell (2004), citing Independent Remuneration Solutions data for the UK; and ‘Höhere Entschädigungen
für Schweizer Verwaltungsräte’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, No. 222, 23 September 2004, p. 21, citing Swiss data.
21 See Ascarelli (2004b), citing a Corporate Board Member Europe survey of 319 senior executives and board members in 14
European jurisdictions.
22 See ‘A Chink in the Boardroom Door’, The Economist, 18 December 2004, p. 119 (citing a Hewitt survey of 170 large US firms
according to which the median retainer for board members rose from $35,000 in 2003 to $40,000 in 2004); and Wighton (2004).
23 See Skapinker (2004), citing Booz Allen Hamilton data for 2003, with 8.1 per cent of fired CEOs for Germany, 6.5 per cent
for the UK, and 4.5 per cent for the USA.
24 See Sapsford and Fackler (2005).
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be content leaving critical issues unaddressed until
generally accepted ‘minimum standards’ emerge.
For example, board collective decision-making, com-
pensation structure, institutional investor govern-
ance or individual shareholder monitoring are topics
that have yet to be seriously tackled.
Regulatory timidity is not limited to local board
reformers, who may be inclined to show higher
deference to the wishes of the dominant interest
group (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Hertig and
Kraakman, 2004). For example, both the SEC and
the EU have demonstrated reluctance to deal with
boards of institutional investors, even though they
play a major governance role. More generally, EU
harmonization proposals do not significantly differ
from what has already been achieved in major
member states.
There are three possible explanations for ‘best
practices’ being no more than ‘minimum’ stand-
ards. One is that board reformers are aware of the
described ‘one-size-fits-all’ issues and prefer to be
considered somewhat ineffective than embark on
inefficient innovation. Another is that minimum
standards are not as ‘minimum’ as they appear. Still
another explanation is that the reform process has
been plagued by regulatory capture. As the next
section shows, there is truth in all of the above, and
the combination results in board reforms being both
inefficient and insufficient.
IV. EFFICIENCY AND REGULATORY
CAPTURE ISSUES
The adoption of minimum standards should mini-
mize one-size-fits-all inefficiencies. After all, juris-
dictions around the word are facilitating transac-
tions by adopting corporate forms that are largely
similar (Kraakman et al., 2004). However, this
presupposes the taking into account of multiple
trade-offs. Thus, increasing shareholder control
over the board could create new avenues for oppor-
tunistic behaviour by either controlling or minority
shareholders. Similarly, reinforcing the board’s
monitoring duties could hamper its ability to fulfil its
strategy function.
In other words, encompassing minimum-standards
reforms requires the careful and objective balance
of multiple factors. Recent board reforms, however,
have been either hastily adopted in the wake of
scandals or driven by institutional investor pressure.
This section thus examines whether time constraints
or regulatory capture have resulted in inefficient or
inadequate reforms.
(i) Trade-offs
There is evidence that reformers failed to take trade-
offs into account adequately. Good examples are
provided by an overview of the impact of new provi-
sions on the functions of the board, the role of gate-
keepers, and the design of compensation packages.
Functions of the board
Boards have multiple functions, the most important
being the setting of the firm’s strategy, the approval
of major corporate actions, the monitoring of on-
going firm activities, and the management of crises
and conflicts of interests. The relative impor-
tance of these functions varies depending upon,
among other things, firm size, shareholder struc-
ture, and firm-specific governance decisions (see
Nadler, 2004).
Reformers have focused on the monitoring and
conflicts-of-interests functions for two reasons.
First, scandals have revealed glaring examples of
non-compliance with accounting and disclosure re-
quirements. Second, many boards have not given
related-party transactions (which include manage-
rial compensation agreements) the attention they
deserve, thus facilitating asset diversion by manag-
ers or controlling shareholders.
As a result, director independence is at the core of
any board reform. Director-independence issues,
however, have not been dealt with from an ‘inde-
pendence of mind’ perspective.25 Reformers chose,
rather, to adopt a combined structure and relation-
ship approach. As indicated in section II, independ-
ence provisions generally call for the board to be
composed of a majority of directors with no per-
sonal, financial, or other links with the firm or its
managers and controlling shareholders.
25 Board self-evaluation rules being the exception that confirms the rule; see section II(ii). Compare Morck (2004) (discussing
director subservience to CEOs and structural factors that may reduce behavioural disposition to obey legitimate authority).
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One issue with ‘no relationship’ directors is that they
may have deficient knowledge about the firm’s
business. This does not necessarily make them
unable to manage conflicts of interests. Theoretical
work and ‘laboratorial’ experiments indicate that
boards with a majority of trustworthy but unin-
formed ‘watchdogs’ may mitigate conflicts of inter-
ests (Gillette et al., 2003). On the other hand, theory
also shows that having a majority of independent
directors could, when insiders have significantly
more information than outsiders, reduce the infor-
mation available to the board at large (Harris and
Raviv, 2004).
This information-reduction risk increases with the
broadening of the scope of regulatory definitions of
independence. The requirement that a majority of
directors can neither be suppliers or customers of
the firms, nor work for related companies is likely to
result in improving boards’ ability to deal with
conflicts of interests. But such boards are also likely
to be worse at making strategic decisions for lack of
industry- or firm-specific knowledge. This func-
tional deficiency will be reinforced if, as indicated by
survey data, board independence reduces coopera-
tive interaction between managers and directors
(Westphal, 1998). Indeed, it seems that the most
productive boards are those where insiders and
outsiders cooperate instead of working against each
other (Langevoort, 2001).
To be sure, the relationship between board inde-
pendence and firm performance remains unclear
(compare Klein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999,
2002). One main issue is the existence of an endog-
enous relation between board composition and firm
performance. It has been shown that board independ-
ence is a function of negotiations between the CEO
and directors, the result of which varies with CEO
quality, which in turn affects performance (Hermalin
and Weisbach, 1998). Interestingly, such bargaining
is not limited to listed firms (see, for example,
Arthur, 2001), but also takes place in firms backed
by venture capitalists (Baker and Gompers, 2003).
There are strong reasons to believe that negotiations
between the CEO and directors reflect a demand
for board members that can act as outside advisors
rather than a willingness to guarantee the participa-
tion of ‘no-relationship’ directors (see also Callahan
et al., 2003). In the USA, for example, outside
directors with political expertise were more com-
mon in the pre-deregulation days than thereafter
(Helland and Sykuta, 2004). Or, to take another
example, bankers that sit on US boards play an
advisory rather than monitoring role—unless the
firm is in financial distress (Booth and Deli, 1999;
Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005). Similar observations can
be made outside the USA, as well as in pre-board-
reform times, for example in Japan at the beginning
of the twentieth century (see Miwa and Ramseier,
2002).
Negotiations about the participation of advisors are
also likely to improve managerial willingness to be
transparent with the board. Logic has it that execu-
tives will prefer informing a board that plays an
important advisory role, than one focusing on moni-
toring and compliance issues (Adams and Ferreira,
2003; see also Ribstein, 2002). This phenomenon is,
unsurprisingly, confirmed by recent empirical data
on UK firms (Lasfer, 2004).
In other words, it should be efficient to have outsid-
ers on the board who can fulfil an important advisory
function. On the other hand, it would be wrong to
argue that outsiders should only play a strategic role,
for the very same reasons that speak against giving
excessive importance to outside directors’ monitor-
ing and conflicts-of-interests roles.
In sum, there is a need for ‘independent’ outside
directors. There is also empirical evidence that
board reforms may contribute to increase board
autonomy (Goyal and Park, 2002; Dahya and
McConell, 2005). What remains unclear, however,
is the kind and degree of independence that is
needed. For example, even as basic a rule as the
requirement that a majority of directors must be
independent may result in the emergence of an
aggressive minority, which could lead to a ‘tyranny
of the executives’ (Eliaz et al., 2004).
It follows that board reformers should refrain from
adopting overly detailed rules. Minimum independ-
ence standards should be as general as possible and
detailed lists of what is or is not an independent
director should be avoided. This would facilitate
board change and, possibly, judicial review, without
costly unintended consequences.
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Role of gatekeepers
Recent board reforms aim at reinforcing the powers
and independence of auditors by reducing board
discretion and setting up independent audit commit-
tees with expertise in financial matters. As indicated
in section II, auditors will thus play an increased
compliance role and management’s ability to dis-
miss auditors will be restricted.
There is a demand for combined gatekeeper activi-
ties by auditors and audit committees (see, for
example, Deli and Gillan, 2000). Moreover, audit
committee financial sophistication can be an impor-
tant factor in constraining earnings management
(see Xie et al. (2003), using US data). Note, how-
ever, that earnings management could persist if
ownership is concentrated and the labour market
not very liquid (see Park and Shin (2004), using
Canadian data).
Gatekeeper reforms also have their costs. They
may force the board to be less entrepreneurial to
avoid costly disclosure of non-compliance with regu-
latory standards because of excessively risk-averse
auditors. More importantly, they contribute to fur-
ther increase the monitoring function of the board by
putting auditing issues at the forefront.
Here again, the issue is one of trade-offs (see also
Kraakman, 2004). It cannot be denied that some
audit committees have not performed adequately. It
is also true that past US limitations on auditor liability
risk had resulted in auditors becoming more compla-
cent and less likely to discover or deter asset
diversion or financial misrepresentations (see also
Coffee, 2002).
On the other hand, it is not clear why reformers have
to deal with audit issues in as much detail as they do.
Combining basic principles of auditor independence
and care with an adequate level of auditor liability
should suffice to solve the problems revealed by
recent scandals. There are, of course, difficulties in
determining the appropriate liability balance (com-
pare Partnoy, 2001; Hamdani, 2003), but they boil
down to setting the amount at which auditor liability
should be capped (Coffee, 2004).26 Any additional
regulatory intervention is likely either to result in
overly costly reductions in board discretion or to
facilitate gatekeeper rent-seeking—an issue that is
addressed in the next section.
In sum, as for board independence, reformers have
adopted rules that are overly detailed.
Compensation
According to board reformers, firms should have
compensation committees composed of independ-
ent directors in majority or totality. Various codes
also recommend that compensation committees
use outside consultants to set appropriate bench-
marks on which to judge managerial perform-
ance—the idea being to prevent executives from
playing the ‘let’s maximize short-term earning per
share’ game.
These reforms are likely to force the board to pay
more attention to the crucial issue of managerial
compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). How-
ever, they also have serious flaws. First, reformers
do not take into account that managers are not only
motivated by money (see Frey (1997) and, more
specifically, Stout (2003)). In particular, top manag-
ers are also significantly motivated by challenge and
self-esteem considerations (Carter and Lorsch,
2004). The focus on compensation may thus have
adverse-selection effects by crowding out those
managers who are less compensation oriented.
Moreover, the hiring of compensation advisors is
likely to cause inefficient increases in compensa-
tion. Consultants will necessarily convey informa-
tion about remuneration in rival or comparable
firms. This will stimulate directors to offer richer
than planned compensation packages to avoid ‘infe-
riority’ compared to the leading firms. In addition,
consultants have an incentive to reinforce this self-
esteem-driven behaviour to the extent they also
operate as head hunters whose earnings vary de-
pending upon their candidates’ remuneration. The
likelihood of such an evolution is confirmed by data
gathered following the introduction of US manda-
tory disclosure requirements for executive compen-
sation. The increased transparency triggered a self-
enforcing process of reference group compensation
(Benz and Stutzer, 2003).
26 This is a practically manageable albeit politically charged issue. See also Hargreaves (2005), reporting on the current liability
capping debate.
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Here again, the point is not that reform is not needed.
Performance-related incentives for outside direc-
tors are non-trivial in the USA, even though com-
pensation remains much lower than for top execu-
tives (Yermack, 2004). There is also evidence that
in large, widely held firms, highly paid CEOs tend to
perform badly (Daines et al., 2005)—especially
when the board lacks independence (Ryan and
Wiggins, 2004).
On the other hand, collusion between executives
and directors could be in the interest of shareholders
if it reduces compensation by limiting firing risk
(Beetsma et al., 2000). More importantly, institu-
tional investors play an increasingly significant com-
pensation-monitoring role (Chung et al., 2002;
Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Ferrarini and Moloney,
2004), which reduces the need for regulatory inter-
vention.
The conclusion is the same as for board functions
and gatekeepers: board reformers have adopted
overly detailed rules.
Summing up, board reformers have enacted mini-
mum standards that embody detailed rules rather
than broad principles. Such regulatory micro-man-
agement may have the advantage of reducing legal
uncertainty and constraining judicial activism. How-
ever, these possible benefits pale in comparison to
the costs resulting from the failure properly to take
into account trade-offs faced by larger firms and
one-size-fits-all effects for smaller firms. This con-
clusion is reinforced by regulatory capture consid-
erations.
(ii) Regulatory Capture
Law-makers have largely delegated board reforms
to self-regulatory bodies. The resulting codes have
generally been drafted by representatives of man-
agers or controlling shareholders. Moreover, those
reforms that have been adopted by law-makers
have been largely influenced by political entrepre-
neurs (see Romano, 2005).
Consequently, board reforms are not a model of
transparency and democracy. This is not to say that
investor interests have not been taken into account.
On the contrary, institutional investors have exer-
cised a significant influence (see, for example, Wu,
2004). However, the role played by political entre-
preneurs and the importance given to self-regulation
had two consequences.
First, the interests of the weakest constituency,
small investors, are likely to have been ignored.
Whenever investor interests have played a role,
reforms have been biased in favour of institutional
investors. The latter, however, also have an interest
in reforms that provide financial or political private
benefits to their controllers, or permit their manag-
ers to shift the blame for insufficient performance
on to boards of operational companies.
Specific examples of inefficient institutional inves-
tor influence are not difficult to find. For example,
rules on the separation of the functions of CEO and
chairman of the board have been adopted following
calls by institutional investors, regardless of the fact
that their costs may exceed their benefits (see
Brickley et al., 1997).27 Similarly, new provisions on
executive compensation may have as much to do
with institutional investors seeking private benefits
as with the setting of an adequate remuneration
framework. For example, fund managers may seek
the disclosure of compensation data because it helps
justify their own salaries and deflects attention from
their own performance. Alternatively, fund manag-
ers may oppose (efficient) forms of remuneration
because they would increase their monitoring costs
more than those of their rivals. More importantly,
provisions on board independence reflect institu-
tional investors’ views of what directors should do
(monitoring), which negatively affects the balance
among board functions.
Second, many important issues are ignored by board
reformers. As indicated above, board collective
decision-making, compensation structure, institu-
tional investor governance, or individual shareholder
monitoring are topics that have yet to be seriously
tackled. While concerns about inefficient regulatory
intervention certainly play a role, interest-group
influence is at least as important a cause of regula-
tory inertia. Managers of operational companies
27 Note that while the NYSE recommends that CEOs should not chair the board, only one-third of the listed US firms have
complied. See Roberts (2004a), citing Governance Metrix International data.
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oppose compensation-structure regulation, whereas
their controlling shareholders are not keen to facili-
tate minority shareholder decision-making.
The same is true for institutional investors. Their
managers and owners have no interest in being the
target of board independence requirements or retail
investor protection regulation. For example, the US
mutual fund industry has strongly opposed the adop-
tion of new SEC rules requiring that the chairman as
well as 75 per cent of mutual fund board members
be independent. Similarly, European fund managers
have expressed concerns about the introduction of
comparable requirements by the European Com-
mission (Skypala, 2005).
Institutional investor opposition to regulatory inter-
vention is not unjustified. Thus, whereas submitting
closed-end investment companies to board inde-
pendence requirements could benefit investors (Dell
Guercio et al., 2003), reforms targeting institutional
investors could also be plagued by the trade-offs and
heterogeneity issues discussed for operational firms.
However, this only means that reformers should
avoid enacting overly detailed rules and, in addition,
focus on the relevant issues.
There are various ways to identify the latter. One is
to assume that institutional investor board deficien-
cies resemble board deficiencies in operational firms.
Consequently, one could simply extend the scope of
minimum standards applicable to the latter. Pro-
vided such minimum standards are sufficiently gen-
eral (principles, not detailed rules) one-size-fits-all
issues should not prove significant. A complemen-
tary approach would be to examine whether those
funds that have individuals rather than institutions as
investors require specific intervention. Indeed, it is
striking that retail investor protection is generally
ignored by board reformers. There are, for example,
few calls for facilitating collective action proce-
dures, even though it can be argued that US corpo-
rate scandals have been facilitated by US reforms
aiming at constraining class actions.
Summing up, it cannot be denied that board reforms
have suffered from regulatory capture. This is
beneficial to the extent that managerial, controlling
shareholder or institutional investor involvement
prevents inefficient regulatory intervention. On the
other hand, it has also barred the adoption of effi-
cient reforms.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Board reforms had to be undertaken to restore
investor confidence, constrain ‘bad’ boards, and
support ‘good’ boards. However, the resulting pro-
visions have generally been drafted in an exces-
sively detailed way. Such an approach has two
major disadvantages. First, while these provisions
are drafted for large listed firms in industrialized
jurisdictions, regulatory and market forces also im-
pose them upon firms in emerging markets or upon
firms that are small and non-listed. To the extent that
board reforms go beyond the setting of general
principles, they inevitably have costly one-size-fits-
all effects. Second, detail regulation magnifies the
negative impact of failing to take into account trade-
offs. For example, the reformers’ focus on board
monitoring activities has hampered the board’s abil-
ity to fulfil its other functions, in particular its strate-
gic functions.
Moreover, interest groups have managed to avoid
reforms that could have significantly infringed their
private benefits. This situation is not only unsatisfac-
tory by itself, it also has ripple effects for operational
firms that are outside the scope of reforms.
It is thus urgent for board reformers to have a hard
look at the ‘minimum standards’ they have enacted
or are currently considering, with the objective of
further simplifying them. Trade-off and ‘one-size-
fits-all’ issues will be minimized, even for small firms
(Freedman, 2003), if principles are the norm and
detailed rules the absolute exception.
Board issues that have been ignored until now
should also be given more adequate consideration.
In particular, board reformers should consider the
extension of minimum standards to institutional in-
vestors with more determination than they have
shown up to now. Here again, to the extent that
reformers revert to a principles rather than detailed-
rule approach, there should be no reason why what
is good for operational firms cannot be good for
pension funds, mutual funds, and similar financial
intermediaries.
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